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OPINION* 
______________ 
 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
 This is the second appeal brought by Robert Livingston, Jr., challenging the 
District Court’s dismissal of his habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  In the 
petition, Livingston claimed that he had been denied a fair trial because the prosecutor 
failed to produce the victim’s criminal history in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 83 (1963).  The District Court held that the victim’s criminal history would not have 
been admissible and therefore dismissed the petition.  We reversed, explaining that the 
District Court erred in “characteriz[ing] [the] admissibility [of the suppressed evidence] 
as a ‘separate, independent prong of Brady.’”  Livingston v. Att’y Gen. N.J., 722 F. App’x 
301, 302 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Dennis v. Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 834 F.3d 263, 310 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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(3d Cir. 2016) (en banc)).  We therefore remanded the case to the District Court for 
reconsideration of Livingston’s Brady claim. 
 On remand, the District Court again found no Brady violation because the 
suppressed criminal history was not favorable or material. See Livingston v. Grewal, No. 
12-5450 (JBS), 2018 WL 4251819, at *1 (D.N.J. 2018). Livingston timely appeals.  For 
the following reasons, we will affirm. 
I. Background 
 A jury found Livingston guilty of felony murder and various other crimes related 
to the killing of Morris Lewis.  See State v. Livingston, No. 96-12-1432, 2011 WL 
5828502, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 21, 2011).  At trial, Livingston admitted 
to killing Lewis by repeatedly striking him on the head with a baseball bat and to robbing 
Lewis after the fact. But Livingston argued that Lewis broke into his house and he killed 
Lewis in self-defense.  During pretrial preparation, counsel for Livingston requested 
information from the prosecution regarding Lewis’s criminal history.  The prosecution, 
however, incorrectly informed defense counsel that Lewis had no criminal history.  In 
fact, Lewis had been arrested for and, in some cases, even pled guilty to several crimes, 
including an arrest for burglary.1  The jury, however, reached its verdict without 
considering any of this evidence. 
                                              
1 We previously summarized these offenses as follows: “Lewis had arrests on 
juvenile petitions for burglary, receiving stolen property, criminal trespass, criminal 
mischief, theft, possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute on 
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 Before sentencing, Livingston timely moved for a judgment of acquittal on the 
grounds that the prosecution violated his rights under Brady in failing to disclose Lewis’s 
criminal history.  The trial court rejected that motion, explaining that Lewis’s criminal 
record would have been inadmissible under state rules of evidence.  On direct appeal, the 
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, affirmed the conviction in relevant 
part.  He then filed a state habeas petition, which the trial court denied.  The Appellate 
Division affirmed that decision, and the New Jersey Supreme Court denied his 
certification for discretionary appeal. 
 Having been denied state post-conviction relief, Livingston filed a federal habeas 
petition in the District of New Jersey.  The District Court dismissed his petition with 
prejudice.  Before Livingston could appeal that decision, this Court decided Dennis, 
which held that the admissibility of the evidence suppressed is not a separate prong of the 
Brady inquiry.  See 834 F.3d at 310.  Livingston then appealed the dismissal of his 
habeas petition.  We reversed and remanded, instructing the District Court “to assess in 
the first instance whether, setting aside the admissibility of the evidence, Livingston has 
established a Brady violation.”  Livingston, 722 F. App’x at 304.   
                                              
or near school property, tampering with evidence, and resisting arrest, and he had pled 
guilty to [juvenile adjudications of] both possession of a controlled dangerous substance 
with intent to distribute on or near school property and to joyriding.”  Livingston, 722 F. 
App’x at 302 n.2.  We further explained that at the time of his death, he was due to 
appear at a “pre-trial status conference . . . for receiving stolen property.”  Id. 
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 On remand, the District Court found the victim’s criminal record neither favorable 
nor material because (1) it could not be used to impeach Lewis, who is deceased; (2) even 
without the criminal record, Livingston’s counsel could have, of its own accord, 
conducted additional factual research into Lewis’s reputation; and (3) the burglary arrest 
on Lewis’s record was too vague to provide any insight into how its disclosure would 
have helped Livingston’s defense.  Accordingly, the District Court found that Livingston 
“ha[d] not demonstrated a likelihood that the victim’s criminal history would have been 
favorable to [Livingston] nor material in that there is a reasonable probability its 
disclosure would have led to a different result.”  Livingston, 2018 WL 4251819, at *1.  
Livingston timely filed this appeal. 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254, and we 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).  See Branch v. Sweeney, 758 F.3d 
226, 232 (3d Cir. 2014).  Our review of the District Court is plenary and we apply the 
same standard as the District Court.  Dennis, 834 F.3d at 280. 
III. Discussion 
 In Brady, the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor must share with defense 
counsel favorable evidence that is “material either to guilt or punishment” and that the 
suppression of such evidence constitutes a due process violation.  Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.  
To establish a claim under Brady, a defendant must demonstrate that (1) the evidence was 
 6 
 
favorable to the defendant; (2) the prosecution suppressed the evidence; and (3) prejudice 
ensued, i.e., the evidence was material.  Lewis v. Horn, 581 F.3d 92, 108 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(citations omitted); see also United States v. Brown, 595 F.3d 498, 509 n.14 (3d Cir. 
2010).   
 Livingston raises three arguments why the District Court erred in determining that 
no Brady violation occurred here.  First, Livingston argues that the District Court’s 
reasoning regarding defense counsel’s ability to conduct factual research without the aid 
of Lewis’s criminal record constitutes an improper inquiry into defense counsel’s 
diligence.  See Dennis, 834 F.3d at 290 (“Brady’s mandate and its progeny are entirely 
focused on prosecutorial disclosure, not defense counsel’s diligence.”).  Second, 
Livingston argues that the District Court applied a standard that is overly stringent in 
light of the relevant Supreme Court and Third Circuit precedents.  Compare Kyles v. 
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) (“The question is not whether the defendant would 
more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in 
its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of 
confidence.” (emphasis added)), with Livingston, 2018 WL 4251819, at *5 (“[T]he Court 
sees no reasonable probability that further investigation by defense counsel armed with 
knowledge of Lewis’s record would have changed the jury’s verdict.” (emphasis added)).  
Third, Livingston argues that confidence in the verdict is indeed undermined by the 
suppressed record because production of the record could have led Livingston to further 
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evidence and arguments that might have bolstered his defense.  Livingston also argues 
that the District Court erred in determining that the suppressed evidence was not 
favorable.   
 Because the Brady factors are conjunctive, the failure to demonstrate that any of 
the factors applies to the case at hand will result in a finding that no Brady violation 
occurred.  Here, because the evidence in question was not material, we need not consider 
Livingston’s arguments as to favorability.   
 None of Livingston’s anticipated uses of Lewis’s juvenile adjudications supports a 
finding that the evidence is material.  Lewis’s juvenile record is not admissible as 
impeachment evidence because Lewis is deceased.  Nor would it be admissible as 
propensity evidence because under New Jersey evidence law, the victim’s prior bad acts 
are not admissible if they did not lead to a conviction.  See N.J. R. Evid. 404(a)(2), 
405(a).  Although Lewis had a juvenile arrest (with no adjudication of guilt) for burglary, 
as the District Court explained, that crime “could encompass a wide range of conduct 
irrelevant to this case.”  Livingston, 2018 WL 4251819, at *6.  Furthermore, Livingston 
has offered little more than speculation that disclosure of Lewis’s juvenile records would 
have led the defense to any admissible evidence that would tend to support Livingston’s 
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claim of self-defense.  Accordingly, the evidence suppressed here, therefore, vague as it 
is, is not material such that it would tend to undermine confidence in the verdict.2   
 We cannot conclude that there is a “reasonable probability that, had the evidence 
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”  
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (opinion of Blackmun, J.).  We 
therefore find that no Brady violation occurred here. 
IV. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order. 
                                              
2 Furthermore, the overwhelming evidence, including the fact that Livingston beat 
Lewis to death by repeatedly striking him on the head with a baseball bat and that 
Livingston robbed him afterwards, tended to support his guilt.   
